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DEVELOPING LITIGATION STRATEGIES
FOR MULTIDISTRICT RELIEF: THE LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY
ON METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
DAVID A. SMITH*
Recently, the federal courts have entertained a series of attacks' on the
composition of racially segregated metropolitan school systems
comprised of independent districts. In order to resolve these disputes the
courts must grapple with the extent to which remedial desegregation
orders may be imposed beyond the boundaries of a single school district
whose discriminatory practices are shown to violate the fourteenth
amendment. The geographical scope of a violation arising from any
particular school or group of schools has been difficult to assess because
the racial polarization presently existing between predominately black
inner city schools and surrounding white suburban school systems2 is
*B.A., Lake Forest College, 1972; J.D., Washington University, 1976.
. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 374 (1975); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board ofEduc.,
189 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474
F.2d 81 (7th Cir.) (Indianapolis I), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); Evansv. Buchanan, 393
F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 381 (1975).
The focus of this Note is on suits brought in federal courts alleging a denial of equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment. For a comparison of treatment of
desegregation cases by the District of Columbia courts under the fifth amendment see
Baratz, Court Decisions and Education Change: A Case History of the D.C. Public
Schools, 1954-1974, 4 J.L. & EDUc. 63 (1975). For an analysis of the federal statutory
approach to school desegregation see Slippen, Administrative Enforcement of Civil
Rights in Public Education: Title VI, HEW, and the Civil Rights Reviewing Authority, 21
WAYNE L. REv. 931 (1975). Plaintiffs may also bring suit in the state courts. See, e.g.,
People v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. App. 3d 252,96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Ct. App.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972); Bookerv. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161,212 A.2d 1
(1965); Addabbo v. Donovan, 16 N.Y.2d 619,209 N.E.2d 112,261 N.Y.S.2d 68, cert. denied,
382 U.S. 905 (1965); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester School Dist., 427
Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967).
2. The black student population in city schools is now over 60% in Chicago, Cleveland,
Detroit, and St. Louis; over 70% in Baltimore and Richmond; and over 80% in Atlanta and
Wilmington. U. S. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DIRECTORY OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN SELECTED DISTRICTS (1972). As reported by the 1970 census, more
than 50'0 of all black citizens lived in urban core areas, and 37% resided in the central cities
of the 25 largest metropolitan areas. U. S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, SOCIAL & ECONOMIC
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often tied to alleged "de facto"3 causes.
In Milliken v. Bradley4 the United States Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs had not established sufficient state imposed racial discrimina-
tion outside Detroit's city schools to warrant the imposition of a
proposed metropolitan desegregation plan. The Milliken court clearly
retreated from precedent which had allowed the imposition of remedial
decrees extending far beyond the initial locus of discriminatory activity.
Consequently, the decision represents a major setback for proponents of
integrated school systems. These proponents had hoped to obviate the
evidentiary and financial burdens of proving constitutional violations
in each of a metropolitan area's independent districts by merely
invoking theories that had previously proved successful in expanding
the remedial consequences of an intradistrict violation.
Milliken, however, has not proved to be an impenetrable barrier to
plaintiffs seeking remedial orders that encompass more than one
adjoining district. In a series of post-Milliken appeals, the Supreme
Court has refused to overturn interdistrict desegregation plans imposed
by lower courts in Wilmington (Delaware), 5 Louisville (Kentucky), 6
suburban St. Louis (Missouri),7 and Indianapolis (Indiana).8  This
Note will examine the impact of the Milliken decision on the analytical
framework previously developed by the Court to determine the
geographical component of a violation in intradistrict litigation.
Following a discussion of some conceptual problems raised by the
Milliken approach to alleged multidistrict violations, the post-Milliken
cases will be used to illustrate litigation strategies designed to achieve
multidistrict relief.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION IN METROPOLITAN 8c NONMETROPOLITAN AREAS:
1960 & 1970, at 23 (1971). Projections indicate that if present trends continue to the year
2000, blacks will comprise 75% of the nation's central city population. U. S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 REPORT: HOUSING (1961).
3. The legal consequence of a "de facto" finding is that the state has no responsibility to
desegregate under the fourteenth amendment. See note 33 infra.
4. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
5. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd, -123 U.S. 963 (1975).
6. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated
and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931
(1975).
7. United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, -123 U.S. 951
(1975).
8. 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
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I. A SYNOPSIS OF THE MILLIKEN DECISION
In 1970, plaintiffs instituted a class action suit9 against certain state
officials and the Board of Education of Detroit,'0 seeking to desegregate
the Detroit Public School System." The district court found that for two
decades the board of education had employed or sanctioned racially
discriminatory policies regarding the creation -and maintenance of
racially selective attendance areas or dual overlapping zones,' 2 the
operation of transportation systems that bused black students past or
away from closer white schools, 3 and racially segregative site selection
practices.' 4 The district judge ruled that such practices evinced an intent
to create and perpetuate racially segregated schools in violation of the
fourteenth amendment.15 In addition, the lower court found that under
Michigan law' 6 the state was derivatively responsible for the racially
9. The original action was brought by the Detroit branch of the N.A.A.C.P. on behalf of
all school children attending Detroit City Schools and all Detroit resident parents with
school-age children. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 722.
10. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Governor of Michigan,
the Attorney General, the State Board of Education, the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction and the Board of Education of the city of Detroit, its members and its former
Superintendent of Schools. The State of Michigan as such was not a party to the suit. See
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 220 (6th Cir. 1973).
11. The suit was initiated shortly after the Michigan State Legislature's repeal of a
proposed desegregation plan for the city of Detroit's public high schools. The plan was
repealed by Act. No. 48, § 12 [1970] Public and Local Acts of Michigan 139-40, MICHIGAN
STAT. ANN. § 15.2298(12) (1975), which sought to delay implementation of the
desegregation plan and to prescribe criteria for "free choice" and "neighborhood schools."
See Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 589 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Plaintiffs sued for a
preliminary injunction to reinstate the desegregation plan which was initially denied by
the district court and by the Sixth Circuit on appeal. 433 F.2d 897,901 (6th Cir. 1970). The
Sixth Circuit, however, held Act No. 48 unconstitutional to the extent that it was designed
to obstruct measures designed to protect rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment,
and remanded for a trial on the merits. Id. at 902. Following extensive proceedings the
district court ruled on the issue of discrimination within the Detroit schools. 338 F. Supp.
582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
12. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587-88 (E.D. Mich. 1971). This was
accomplished, in part, by racial gerrymandering of attendance zones, feeder patterns and
grade structures to incorporate existing residential patterns of segregation into the
schools. Id. at 588.
13. Id. at 588.
14. Id. at 589.
15. Id. at 592. The standard for intent used by the district court was whether these actions
had the "natural, probable, foreseeable and actual effect" of fostering the exodus of white
families from identifiably black schools. Id. at 587.
16. See Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.W. 289, 290 (1902), afr'd,
199 U.S. 233 (1905); MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
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discriminatory actions of its school districts.1 7 Finally, the court found
that certain actions of the Michigan legislature and the state board of
education had been taken with the purpose and effect of limiting the
Detroit school board's options for reducing racial imbalance.18
The lower court then ordered the city defendants to submit a
desegregation plan which was to encompass "Detroit only," and
directed the state to devise a plan involving school districts throughout
the three county metropolitan area.' 9 The suburban districts had not
been parties to the action,20 and consequently, there was no specific
allegation that activities originating within or radiating from their
jurisdictions had violated plaintiff's rights. The court, however,
concluded that it had the power to impose a multidistrict remedy.2t
Further, it held that since "Detroit only" relief would be constitutional-
ly inadequate its duty was to look beyond the "corporate geographical
limits of the city" 22 for a solution. The Sixth Circuit found substantial
evidence to support the lower court's finding of a violation23 and its
conclusion that a constitutionally adequate system of desegregated
17. 338 F. Supp. at 589. The district court characterized the state's power over local
school districts as plenary. Id.
18. Id. The state was found to have violated plaintiff's right to equal protection by
failing to supervise local school board site selection policies fostering segregated
attendance zones, by discriminating in the funding of student transportation programs,
and by enacting Act No. 48 to "impede, delay and minimize racial integration in the
Detroit schools." Id.
19. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914,917-19 (E.D. Mich. 1972). The court stated that
its objective was to find a plan "designed to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation." Id. at 916.
20. Some of the suburban districts were permitted to intervene for the limited purpose of
advising the court as to the propriety and form of proposed interdistrict desegregation
plans. For a summary of the district court's treatment of the intervention issue see 418 U.S.
at 730-32.
21. 345 F. Supp. at 916. Stating that "school district lines are simply matters of political
convenience and may not be used to deny constitutional rights," the court concluded that
the state "cannot escape its constitutional duty to desegregate the public schools of the City
of Detroit by pleading local authority." 484 F.2d at 244 (quoting district court's
conclusions of law).
22. 345 F. Supp. at 916. The plan eventually adopted by the district judge directed a
consolidation of 54 of the tri-county's 86 districts, and ordered pupil transfers from both
races as well as a ten percent minimum quota of black faculty and staff in each school. It
was to be based on 15 clusters, each containing part of the Detroit system and two or more
suburban districts. Id. at 928-29.
23. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 241-45 (6th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 11:187
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol11/iss1/7
METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
schools could not be achieved solely within the city of Detroit.24 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded the case for the
formulation of a desegregation plan restricted to the city of Detroit.
Chief Justice Burger,25 considering plaintiff's right to equal
protection in the context of a specific geographic area, found that the
violation had occurred 26 solely within the confines of the city school
district. Having thus characterized the geographical extent of the
condition offending the constitution, the Chief Justice proceeded to
consider the proper scope of the court's equitable powers by invoking
the maxim that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy."27 Accordingly, the majority held that federal courts lack the
constitutional power to remedy interdistrict segregation absent a
finding that discriminatory acts of one or more districts have
substantially caused a significant "segregative effect" in neighboring
districts, or that the state itself has created or fostered segregation among
adjoining districts. 28
The Court declared that the multidistrict remedy imposed by the
lower courts was based on a "wholly impermissible" standard2 9 which
could be supported "only by drastic expansion of the constitutional
right itself, an expansion without any support in either constitutional
principle or precedent." 3° A closer analysis of existing case law,
however, reveals that there was ample support for the approach taken by
the lower courts.
II. THE IMPACT OF MWILLIKEN ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL
TREATMENT OF AN EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION
It is true that Milliken represents the first attempt by the Supreme
Court to examine the propriety of an interdistrict remedy. Nevertheless,
24. Id. at 242. The appellate court remanded, however, for a joinder of all suburban
districts that might be affected by the plan. Id. at 251-52.
25. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. Justice
Stewart filed a concurring opinion to form a majority.
26. 418 U.S. at 738 & n.18. There was no dispute among the Justices that the Detroit
school system had been illegally segregated. All agreed that on the basis of Keyesv. School
District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the lower courts' findings were supported by the
evid-nce. For further explanation of Keyes see note 63 and accompanying text infra.
27.4 18 U.S. at 738, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971).
28. Id. at 745.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 747,
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the clear implication of decisions prior to Milliken had been that
metropolitan-wide remedial decrees would, under certain cir-
cumstances, be permissible to combat interdistrict segregation. Follow-
ing the historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I),31 the
courts developed an anlytical framework for the resolution of school
desegregation issues arising within a single school district.32 The
underlying concept used to determine the circumstances in which the
existence or operation of racially segregated public schools violates the
fourteenth amendment focuses on whether policies or practices of the
state or its agencies have been causal factors in the creation or fostering
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. Much of the early debate over the Brown I decision centered on the proper limits of
judicial intervention. Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959) (no basis for judicial review of school segregation issues on "neutral grounds" since
underlying question is one of association), with Pollack, Racial Discrimination and
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959). See also
Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960) (general
purpose of the fourteenth amendment supports judicial intervention). While Brown I held
that state-imposed segregation of public schools violates the equal protection clause, it
provided only minimal guidance concerning the nature of the constitutional right being
upheld. Two elements appeared essential to the Brown I holding. overt government
classification by race and psychological or educational harm to minority school children
resulting from racial isolation. For nearly two decades after Brown I the Supreme Court
refrained from ruling on the relative importance of these two elements to cases arising
outside the context of state imposed dual schools.
Between 1954 and 1973 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in several cases that
presented the issue whether states that had not required dual schools prior to Brown could
be ordered to desegregate. See, e.g., Downsv. Boardof Educ., 336F.2d988 (10th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Sealyv. Department of Pub. Instruction, 252 F.2d898 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958). During this period, the lower courts and their critics
developed at least three views of Brown I, each of which approaches the issue of
constitutional rights by discussing the conditions of segregated schools whose existence
violates equal protection.
Under one approach, the condition of racially imbalanced schools, per se, is presumed
to have a detrimental effect on minority school children. Consequently, the existence of
segregated schools resulting from any state act, or any failure to act where the segregated
result was reasonably foreseeable, raises an affirmative duty to desegregate. This approach
is grounded in the attention given by the Brown court to the psychological impact of racial
separation. 347 U.S. at 494. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case
- Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CnI. L. REv. 697 (1971);
Goodman, DeFacto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analyszs, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 275 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Goodman]; Kaplan, Segregation Litigation
and the Schools, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 57 (1964); Wright, Public School Desegregatzon:
Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 285, 291-92 (1965). For an
empirical evaluation of this view compare the social science evidence cited in Brown, 347
U.S. at 494-95 n. 11, with Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on Aspirations, Self-
Concepts and Other Aspects of Personality, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 300 (1975). The
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of segregated schools. This distinction 33 is based upon the assumption
that racial polarization may arise from and be perpetuated by "unknown
and perhaps unknowable factors such as in-migration, birthrates,
economic changes, or cumulative acts of private racial fears." 34
Accepting this premise it follows that the constitution simply does not
allow federal courts to attempt to change the operation of segregated
school systems unless and until it is shown that the state, or its political
subdivisions, have contributed to cause the situation to exist."3 5
majority of cases have rejected this approach. Accord, Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369
F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d
988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); see Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027
(1972), affg mem. 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971); Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819
(N.D. Ind.), afrd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
Under a second approach, the violation depends upon state responsibility for segregated
schools which provide minority children unequal or inferior educational opportunities.
Although the equal educational opportunity approach has been subject to varied
interpretations, the elements determinative of a violation are: a condition of segregated
school attendance patterns; state responsibility for the condition; resulting inequality or
inferiority of the minority facilities; and no nonracial justification for state actions which
caused the segregation. These elements also provide the basis for distinguishing between
de jure and de facto segregation. See Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1028 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), affg mem., 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971); Wright, supra, at
299. Compare Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 HAiv. L. REv. 564 (1965) (analyzing variations of the "equal educational" approach),
with Kaplan, supra at 157. For a discussion of whether equal educational opportunity
should be treated as a fundamental right and hence whether the nonracial state interest
would be judged by strict scrutiny rather than the rational basis test see Goodman, supra,
at 343-73 (1972). But cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). The third approach was that adopted in Keyes. See text at notes 63-66 infra.
33. The terms de facto and de jure have been used as legal conclusions to distinguish
between those segregated conditions that the state is found to have caused and is therefore
obligated to relieve (de jure), and those that are held to be the product of "natural forces"
(de facto). It is ironic that these terms which have come to play such an important role in
the terminology of school desegregation cases, were incorporated into school desegrega-
tion analysis by a court which held that "it is of no moment whether the segregation is
labelled by the defendant as 'dejure' or'de facto'. ... Constitutional rights are determined
by realities, not by labels or semantics." Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 194
(S.D.N.Y.), afrd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961). The court went on to state that "if these terms
must be used, 'de jure' should refer to segregation created or maintained by official act,
regardless of its form. 'De facto' should be limited to segregation resulting from fortuitous
residential patterns." Id. at 194 n.12. See generally Moses v. Washington Parish School
Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
34. 418 U.S. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. Id. But cf. Taylor, The Supreme Court and Urban Reality: A Tactical Analysis of
Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 751, 760-63 (1975) (challenging the court's
assumptions regarding the causes of racially segregated school systems) [hereinafter cited
as Taylor].
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Prior to Milliken, the Court had fostered two maj or expansions of the
underlying de facto/de jure distinction. First, in the immediate
aftermath of Brown, the Court expanded the state's remedial duty to
eradicate the effects of racial segregation previously imposed by state
law.3 6 As litigation pressing for the desegregation of northern and
western urban centers intensified, 7 the Court permitted a second
expansion, this time allowing a broad characterization of the
geographical scope of an initial de jure violation. 8 The following
sections will examine these expansions and the extent to which they may
be applied to achieve multidistrict desegregation orders after Milliken.
A. Derivation and Analysis of the
"Affirmative Duty" Remedial Standard
Following Brown I it became clear that the Court was determined to
use its remedial powers to achieve more than the simple repeal of state
legislation requiring segregated schools. In Brown I139 the Supreme
Court imposed upon local school authorities the "primary responsibil-
ty" for transforming their statutorily created dual schools into a
"racially non-discriminatory school system.''40 The district courts
assumed the primary responsibility of supervising this process. Brown II
directed the lower courts to invoke traditional equitable principles to
effectuate the "interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as
soon as practicable on a non-discriminatory basis," and to facilitate the
adjustment and reconciliation of public and private needs."
Although Brown II charged the lower courts with supervising the
remedial process and equipped them with equitable powers, the
36. See text at notes 39-60 infra.
37. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Detroit); Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (Denver); Oliver v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1974) (Kalamazoo); Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir.
1974) (Dayton); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs; 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973) (Indianapolis); Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973) (Las Vegas); Spangler v. Board of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501
(C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 427 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1970) (Pasadena).
38. See text at notes 61-70 infra.
39. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40. Id. at 301. Where school authorities fail to present an "effective" desegregation plan,
the federal courts are free to devise their own or to grant injunctive or declarative relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1343 (3)-(4), 2201-02 (1970).
41. 349 U.S. at 300.
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decision left uncertainty concerning the extent to which a court could
use equitable powers to achieve a "racially non-discriminatory school
system." Clearly, the mandate of the district courts extended to the
prevention of acts by legislatures and public officials that were
deliberately designed to perpetuate existing racial imbalance. 2 It was
not clear, however, whether remedial plans that employed racially
neutral transfer options and "freedom of choice" provisions in
conjunction with existing racially segregated residential patterns
constituted adequate compliance.4 3
In a trilogy of cases"* the Supreme Court clarified the remedial goal.
In each of these cases the Court invalidated facially neutral pupil
assignment plans that failed "to produce a unitary nonracial school
system. ' 4 -5 Accordingly, the Court charged any state that had formerly
imposed a dual system at the time of Brown I with an affirmative
duty "to take whatever steps that might be necessary to convert to
a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch. ' 46 By rejecting the use of "freedom of
12. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
-13. Immediately following Brown II, most courts adopted the oft-quoted dictum in
Briggs. v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955), to the effect that state-imposed
segregation was prohibited, while integration was not required. United States v. Board of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), affd on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385, cert. denied sub
nom. Cado Parish School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967), marked a significant
departure from earlier desegregation law, holding that there is an affirmative duty to
integrate schools that were formerly segregated by state action asserting "Brown, requires
public school systems to integrate students, faculties, facilities, and activities." 372 F.2d at
816 & n.5. Following the Jefferson decision the courts of appeals were split on the notion of
an "affirmative obligation" to bring desegregation. For a summary of these cases see Read,
Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education,
39 LAW : CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 10-28 (1975).
44. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
413 (1968); Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
15. Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1968) (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 137-38. The Court then went on to say:
The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.
... The matter must be assessed in the light of the circumstances present and the
options available in each instance. It is incumbent upon the school board to
establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate progress
toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. It is incumbent upon the district
court to weigh that claim in light of the facts at hand and in light of any alternatives
which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their effectiveness.
Id. at 439.
Prior to Green affirmative duties did not "naturally" flow from the fourteenth
amendment. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,286 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,403
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choice"47 and "free transfer" plans,4 8 neither of which made use of
racial criteria on their face, the Court disregarded the de facto/dejure
standards. Absent a prior violation, these methods of pupil assign-
ment would not have evinced an intent to discriminate on the basis
of race and thus would not have constituted de jure violations. Due
to the imposition of an affirmative duty, however, the Court's
analysis of de jure segregation at the violation stage. While the Court
continued to determine the existence of a violation according to the
presence or absence of racial discrimination, it began looking to
actual integration as the target of desegregation at the remedial
stage.4 9
(1945); McAuliffe, School Desegregation: The Problem of Compensatory Discrimination,
57 VA. L. REv. 65 (1971). But see Askin, The Case for Compensatory Treatment, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 65 (1969).
The Court in Green cites from Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965), to
support its theory of affirmative duty. "We bear in mind that the court has not merely the
power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." The basis
of the suit in Louisiana was discrimination against black applicants for voting
registration according to an "interpretation test." The Court, after holding the test to be in
violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, not only threw out the test as a
means of voting registration but further held that any new test devised by the state was to be
applied to all voters, not just to those who were unregistered at the time when the test was
thrown out.
Other cases cited as support for the imposition of an affirmative duty in Green were cases
which used equitable powers to remedy commercial "conditions" that could not
adequately be remedied by a simple injunction. See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312
U.S. 426, 436-37 (1941); NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry DockCo., 308 U.S.
241, 250 (1939); Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77-78 (1911). The Court in
Standard Oil, after finding a violation of the federal anti-monopoly laws, stated:
It may be conceded that ordinarily where it was found that acts had been done in
violation of the statute, the adequate measure of relief would result from restraining
the doing of such acts in the future. But in a case like this, where the condition
which has been brought about in violation of the statute, in and of itself is not only a
continued attempt to monopolize, but also a monopolization, the duty to enforce
the statute requires the application of broader and more controlling remedies.
Id. at 77 (emphasis added). Whether and to what degree these principles apply to make
school desegregation cases into school integration cases will depend upon how the
"condition" which violates the statute is interpreted. See notes 60-62 and accompanying
text infra.
47. Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S.
.130 (1968).
48. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
49. After the decisions in Green, Raney and Monroe, the Fifth Circuit indicated
increasing impatience with desegregation plans, whether free-choice, zoning or other,
which failed to produce results. School attendance zone plans that followed natural or
historical boundary lines but resulted in little desegregation were condemned in three
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Three years later, the Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education50 substantially widened the gap. The violation in
Swann was based upon the defendants' operation of segregated schools
prior to Brown I. The district court in Swann found the school board's
"freedom of choice plans" 5' inadequate, and after ordering the
submission of new desegregation plans, adopted a proposal designed to
reflect the community's overall racial balance.5 2 The proposal required
the limited use of racial quotas, pairing and clustering of neighborhood
schools, and the busing of students to alleviate the "vestiges" of former
discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and
accepted the district court order in its entirety. Chief Justice Burger,
writing for a unanimous Court, made it clear that neither the
responsible state education officials nor the district courts could rely on
plans that "may fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school
segregation.',5 3
Without defining many key terms, the Chief Justice directed the lower
courts to consider substance over form in adopting plans that are
"workable," "effective" and "realistic" to transform "dual schools" into
"unitary systems." 54 The Court then said that the very existence of
important opinions issued in early 1969. United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate
School Dist., 110 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970); Henry v.
Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
910 (1969); United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School Dist., 406 F.2d 1086
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969). Similar rulings were forthcoming from other
circuits. See, e.g., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 427 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1970); Clark v.
Board of Educ.. 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952(1971); Brewerv. School
Bd., 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968).
50. .02 U.S. 1 (1971).
51. This plan had been approved by the district court prior to the Green decision.
Following Green, plaintiffs moved for further relief. 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965),
aff'd, 369 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1966).
52. The school board's plan, which would have left the racial composition of the
elementary schools unchanged, was rejected. The district court adopted instead a plan
submitted by a local school expert. 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
53. 402 U.S. at 28.
54. Id. at 31. The extent of the state's affirmative duty was further refined in North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971). The Court in North Carolina
declared unconstitutional a portion of the North Carolina statutes known as the Anti-
Busing Law that flatly forbade assignment of any student on account of race or for the
purpose of creating a racial balance or ratio in the schools. The Court ruled that "if a state-
imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion operates to inhibit or obstruct the
operation of a unitary-school system or impede the disestablishing of a dual school system,
it must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal
constitutional guarantees." Id. at 45.
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racially identifiable schools, at the remedial stage, leads to a presump-
tion that existing segregation is the product of an impermissible cause.55
Thus, the Court shifted to the defendants the burden of distinguishing
between the residual effects of the initial "de jure" violation and the
intervening effects of subsequent "de facto" segregation. 56 In addition to
questioning segregation per se at the remedial stage, Swann reemphasiz-
ed the broad powers of equity to vindicate constitutional violations even
when "[t]he remedy ... may be administratively awkward, in-
convenient, and... bizarre. '57 The Court sanctioned the use of remedial
decrees that employ racial quotas as well as provisions for majority to
minority transfer options, redrawing of attendance zones, and student
busing.58
It is not surprising that the Swann Court devoted much attention to
the discussion of equity's powers and very little to its proper limits,
given the extreme resistence engendered by the Brown holdings59 and the
clarity of the violation in states that had required dual schools by law.
Nevertheless, the Court did recognize some limitations on the use of
equitable power: "[A] school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable
remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to
correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interest, the
condition that offends the Constitution."60 The opinion, however, was
unclear concerning how these limitations were to be invoked. This
shortcoming in the Court's analysis proved to be problematic as the
cause of school desegregation moved into the metropolitan context.
55. 402 U.S. at 25-26.
56. 402 U.S. at 26. This shift has been labeled "contrived." The Court in Swann neither
attempted to determine the presence or the degree of post-1954 contribution to the
segregated condition, and led one author to conclude: "The existence of past
discrimination was thus used as a 'trigger' - and not fora pistol, but for a cannon." Fis,
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case, supra note32. For a discussion of whether attaching an
affirmative duty isj ustified see Goodman, supra note 32, at 292-95; Comment, Cwzl Rights
v. Individual Liberty: Swann, and Other Monsters of Impetuous Justice, 5 IND. L. F. 368
(1972).
57. 402 U.S. at 28.
58. Id. at 22-31.
59. For a detailed history of state attempts to frustrate the Brown I mandate see U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 REPORT 65-77, 101-04; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1959
REPORT 196-234.
60. 402 U.S. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
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B. Defining the "Condition that Offends" the Constitution
The continuing impact of racially discriminatory acts on school
attendance patterns will vary with the circumstances of each case.61
Conceptually, the effects of de jure segregation may be confined to a
particular school or may extend to an entire neighborhood, district or
metropolitan system. According to the analysis in Swann, once 'the
Court has found initial de jure segregation, the scope of the offending
condition 2 will determine the limits of the Court's power to impose an
affirmative duty on the state.
61. There are two important considerations regarding the timing of state action as it
relates to a present condition of segregated schools. Tae first consideration relates to
finding a violation in schools that were operating as dual systems at the time of Brown L At
what point in time after 1954 can it be said that, in the absence of additional de jure acts, the
"vestiges" of pre-Brown discrimination no longer can be related to the present segregated
condition? See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 423
U.S. 951 (1975) (vestiges rationale for violation in 1975 based on a pre-1954 action). The
second temporal consideration relates to the remedial stage. At what point in time can a
state, having been found in violation,be said to have discharged its affirmative duty? See,
e.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 519 F.2d 430, 431 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1975). The
Swann standard is based upon the achievement of "unitary" schools, 402 U.S. 1, 15(1971).
This term has never been defined although there is some indication of its meaning in
Suann. "The existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race schools
within a district, is not in and of itself the mark of a system which still practices segregation
by law." Id. at 26. Further.
Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make
year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the
affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action is eliminated from the system.
Id. at 31-32. But cf. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732,744 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972) (population shifts in the metropolitan school district
changing the racial composition of some schools during the course of the litigation does
not eliminate the duty of the school board to present a plan for a unitary school system).
62. A geographical element is necessary to define the "condition that offends" and to
provide some frame of reference within which to ascertain the "unitary" nature of the
schools. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974). In Bulluck v. Washington, 468
F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the circuit court refused to invalidate a congressional statute
that was designed to remove funds from a program that had paid for black student busing
from all black District of Columbia schools to white Maryland districts that had voluntary
desegregation programs. Id. at 1108. The court reasoned that since the equal protection
clause refers to the states, no right to equal protection exists beyond the borders of each
state. Id. at 1105. Query whether interstate cooperation could produce state responsibility
beyond its own boundaries?
Courts have found a violation based on classroom segregation within an otherwise
"integrated" school building. Jackson v. Marvell School Dist. No. 22, 425 F.2d 211 (8th
Cir. 1970). Segregation within groups of "neighborhood" schools has been held to be
actionable when the segregation is imposed by law, e.g., Swannv. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), or is the result of nationally standardized test scores used as
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The Supreme Court in Keyes v. School District No. 163 facilitated the
ability of plaintiffs to expand the geographical scope of a particular de
jure violation by adopting a system of shifting presumptions. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, recognized a "purpose or intent to
discriminate" on the part of the Denver school authorities, and devised a
three-tiered analytical test to determine the discrimination's
geographical component. 64 In applying this test, the Court held that a
finding of intentional segregative action by authorities in one portion of
a school district "establishes ... a prima facie case of unlawful
segregation design on the part of the school authorities, and shifts to
[them] the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the
system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions." 65 To
overcome this evidentiary presumption, school authorities are required
the basis of assigning students to a particular school building. E.g., Moses v. Washington
Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972); Lemon v.
Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); cf. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp.
1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub noma.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. cir. 1969).
63. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). School District No. 1 includes the entire city and county of
Denver. Neither the city of Denver nor the state of Colorado had ever explicitly required
racial segregation in the public schools. Segregatory conditions did exist, however, in the
Denver school system and were particularly severe in the area known as Park Hill.
Resolutions passed by the school board would have altered the attendance zones in the
Park Hill area but were subsequently rescinded. The district court decision to prevent the
rescission was upheld by the Supreme Court. The basis for the Court's decision was that for
over a decade, the school board had gerrymandered attendance zones, used "optional
zones" and excessively employed mobile classrooms to foster segregation in the Park Hill
area. Further, the assignment of teachers and staff on the basis of race was found to have
occurred throughout the system. The initial finding of intent was based on these facts. 413
U.S. at 191-98.
64. The first stage requires a showing that the area initially found to be in violation,
constitutes a "substantial" portion of the entire district. 413 U.S. at 201. At the second
stage, the school board must prove that their "racially inspired.., actions [did not] have
an impact beyond the particular schools that are the subject of those actions." Id. at 203.
This could be accomplished byshowing either that no segregative conditions exist outside
the initial "substantial" portion, or, that the portion in violation is a "separate,
identifiable and unrelated" section of the school district that should be treated as isolated
-from the rest of the district. Id. The third stage, see text at note 65 infra, operates "even if it
is determined that different areas of the school district should be viewed independently [at
the second stage]." Id. at 208. See generally Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1:
Unlocking The Northern Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS - Civ. LiE. L. REv.
124 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Unlocking The Northern Schoolhouse]; 45 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 457, 474-85 (1974) (analysis and criticism of Justice Brennan's test).
65. 413 U.S. at 208. As a rationale for this third stage, Justice Brennan explained that "a
finding of intentional segregation as to a portion of a school system is not devoid of
probative value in assessing the school authorities' intent with respect to other parts of the
same school system." Id. at 207.
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to prove a lack of any causal connection between their discriminatory act
and the segregative attendance patterns existing throughout the
remainder of the school district. Unless the authorities are able to
overcome this heavy burden, the entire district will be deemed to have
been infected by the initial de jure act. The Court's justification for this
shift in the burden of proof was that discriminatory acts in one portion
of a school district are likely to have a "substantial reciprocal effect on
the racial composition of other nearby schools [and] of residential
neighborhoods within a metropolitan area." 66
The decisions in both Swann and Keyes used shifting burdens of proof
to expand the possibility that state or local defendants would be held
responsible for desegregating schools. A plaintiff may rely on these
decisions to achieve district-wide relief even though he has only met the
strict evidentiary standards to establish a de jure violation at some
previous point in time, or for some particular area within the district.
This result is achieved because the Court is willing to treat the initial de
jure showing as a trigger for expanded judicial intervention in
situations that otherwise would have been viewed as de facto.67
Conceptually, these decisions diminish the importance of the de
facto/de jure distinction in single district litigation by expanding the
state's responsibility to eradicate racially segregated schools, whetheror
not plaintiff can prove that the state was immediately and directly
responsible for the segregation. 68
66. Id. at 202. But see Unlocking The Northern Schoolhouse, supra note 64, at 132-33,
concluding that:
[T]he reciprocal effects which do emanate from a de jure practice in one portion
of a school district are likely to be minor in impact and limited in range .... The
Court's conclusion that a finding of meaningful de jure segregation will support
desegregation of the entire district therefore derives little support from the realities
of urban demographic patterns. It permits a remedy which may far exceed the actual
extent of state-induced school segregation.
67. 413 U.S. at 202. The Keyes decision, especially when read together with the denied
certiorari four days later in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d
142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973), seems to reject arguments for less-than-
district-wide relief, based upon claims that not all of the segregation within a district is de
jure.
68. Justice Powell criticised the court for maintaining the de facto/de jure distinction at
all and argued instead that the fourteenth amendment gives rise to "the right... to expect
that once the state has assumed responsibility for education, local school boards will
operate integrated school systems within their respective districts." 413 U.S. at 225-26 n. 11
(Powell, J., concurring). In addition to expanding the notion of plaintiff's rights, see note
32 supra, Justice Powell would severely restrict the court's use of remedial tools to redress
equal protection violations. 413 U.S. at 236-52.
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As a practical matter, Swann adopted the presumption that all racially
identifiable schools within formerly dual systems are historical vestiges
of former discrimination to insure the complete eradication of state
imposed segregation. Swann was directed to those states that imposed
segregation by law prior to Brown I and consequently caused a shift
away from the de facto/de jure standards that affected litigants primarily
in the southern states. Keyes reduced this differential sectional impact
by providing northern and western plaintiffs with a new procedural
advantage. In combination, Swann and Keyes enabled the courts to
reduce the complex analysis of segregative cause to an initial threshold
inquiry and no doubt have contributed to the large scale desegregation
of school districts that has occurred across the country. 70
C. How Far Does Milliken Limit Expansive Geographical
Treatment of an Initial De Jure Finding?
With the benefit of the recent Keyes decision,7t the Supreme Court in
Milliken could have upheld the lower court decisions by adopting either
of two available alternatives. Under the Keyes rationale, proof of a de
jure violation within Detroit could have been used to shift to the state
defendants the burden of disproving their purpose to discriminate
throughout the remainder of the metropolitan area.72 Alternatively, a
remedial approach could have been adopted - charging the state with
an affirmative duty to take "whatever steps necessary" to eliminate the
effects of racially discriminatory acts committed within Detroit.7 3 While
69. See generally Diamond, School Segregation in the North: There Is But One
Constitution, 7 HARv. Civ. Rwtnrs - Civ. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1972); Karst, The Fourteenth
Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383. State imposed
segregation was not unknown in the North. Statutes authorizing racially segregated
public schools appeared at various times prior to Brown in Illinois Indiana, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio and Wyoming. U.S. COMM'N on CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL
ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 42 (1967).
70. See Pettigrew, A Sociological View of the Post-Bradley Era, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 813,
818 (1975) (empirical analysis of desegregation "progress" since 1954).
71. The Keyes decision was delivered shortly after the Sixth Circuit had decided
Milliken.
72. See Unlocking The Northern Schoolhouse, supra note 64, at 151-53.
73. The lower courts had concluded that a "Detroit only" remedy would be
constitutionally inadequate and that only a metropolitan remedy could protect the rights
of Detroit school children. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra. Both the Burger
and Stewart opinions clearly rejected this remedial approach, the Chief Justice stating that
the purpose of desegregation remedies is "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct
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the affirmative duty in prior cases had most frequently been applied to
remedy intradistrict violations, arguably there was ample precedent to
support an order to cross school district lines if this were necessary to
achieve desegregation of the city schools. An affirmative duty has been
invoked in this manner when the lines themselves had initially been
drawn with a discriminatory purpose.7 4 A multidistrict remedy had also
been deemed appropriate to prevent some portions of formerly unified
school systems from reforming boundary lines in order to evade
judicially ordered desegregation. 75 Thus, the Sixth Circuit in Milliken
to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." 418 U.S. at 746.
The Chief Justice went on to criticize the argument accepted by the dissent that the
affirmative duty standard should apply across school district lines. Id. at 747 & n.22.
74. See Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969). In Haney an
injunction against the continued maintenance of racially segregated systems of public
education in Sevier County, Ark., was upheld. The districts had been formed in response to
a 1948 legislative enactment calling for the consolidation of all districts within any county
where the districts served fewer than 350 students. Id. at 923-24. The consolidation was
directed to occur in accord with existing law which required segregated schools within
each district. Since the resulting district lines reflected a discriminatory pattern the Eighth
Circuit ruled that de jure segregation had been established. Id. The court thus defined the
"condition that offends" by extending state accountability for the initial discriminatory
acts - first in terms of the time of their occurrence and then in terms of their geography.
In support of its result the court employed the rationale of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960), stating that "the creation, maintenance and perpetuation of racially
discriminators district lines- whether for the purpose of elections or school attendance -
is Constitutionally improper." 410 F.2d at 924-25. The Haney court stated that "political
-subdivisions are mere lines of convenience for exercising divided governmental
responsibilities." Id. at 925. See also United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex.
1970), ajfd, 417 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). There are,
howevecr, some basic problems with this analogy: (1) since the right to an equal
educational opportunity (unlike the right to vote) is not a fundamental right, theexistence
of ogrcgated schools may be supported by justifications that would fail to support a
dilution of voting rights; (2) the "condition that offends" in the school context may be
limited to school district or political subdivision boundaries whereas voting rights
violations by nature transverse such boundaries; (3) finally, even where the degrees of state
responsibility for segregated schools extends beyond a single political subdivision, there
may be special policy or administrative reasons for limiting the affirmative duty imposed
at the rcmedial stage to a single political subdivision. See text at notes 82-85 infra.
75. See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v.
Council of tlr City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448
F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1971); Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School Dist., 442 F.2d 584 (4th
Cir. 1971); Aytch v. Mitchell, 320 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Turner v. Warren County
Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. N.C. 1970); Burleson v. County Bd. of Election
Cmm'rs, 308 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1970). The Supreme Court in Wright and Scotland
Neck held the secessions invalid. In Wright, Justice Stewart, writing for a majority of five
found that if the area attempting to secede was part of the system which was ordered to
desegitegate, there is no need fora showing of an independent constitutional violation. 407
U.S. at 459. Rather, the court's remedial powers would be invoked on the basis of
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was not without precedent when it reasoned, "[I]f school boundary lines
cannot be changed for an unconstitutional purpose, it follows logically
that existing boundary lines cannot be frozen for an unconstitutional
purpose." 76
Chief Justice Burger chose neither course. The Burger opinion
accepted the lower court's finding of a de jure violation within Detroit
segregation in the system as a unit. Id. at 459-60. Further, the validity of the action would
be judged by its effects on the process of desegregation - "not the purpose or motivation"
- of a school board's action in determining whether it is a permissible method of
dismantling a dual system. "The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an
action that has an impermissible effect." Id. at462. In terms of racial percentages, however,
the effect according to Chief Justice Burger seemed to be too slight to be labeled
impermissible. The county as a whole consisted of 34% white and 66% black students.
Emporia's newly created district would have consisted of 48% white and 52% black students
and would leave the surrounding county public schools with 28% whites and 72% blacks.
Id. at 464. In his dissent the Chief Justice argued:
Since the goal is to dismantle dual school systems rather than to reproduce in each
classroom a microcosmic reflection of the racial proportions of a given geographic
area, there is no basis for saying that a plan providing a uniform racial balance is
more effective or constitutionally preferred.
Id. at 474. This shift to an effects test is supportable on the basis of the affirmative duty to
integrate at the remedial stage. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, apparently retreated from
the affirmative duty standard. He proposed limiting the discretion of the district court's
remedial powers where separate political entities are involved, due to the importance of
local control over the schools and the questionable nature of the evidence regarding the
segregatory effects that would come from allowing the severance. The Chief Justice,
however, joined the majority in invalidating a similar attempt to create a separate school
district in Scotland Neck. The rationale that underlies Chief Justice Burger's distinction of
Wright in Scotland Neck further suggests his disparaging view of the affirmative duty
remedial standard. See 407 U.S. at 492 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Arguably, the Chief
Justice's opinion in Milliken reflects a similar backing away from the affirmative duty
focus. See 418 U.S. at 746-47 & n.22.
76. 484 F.2d at 250. But cf. Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), aff'd, 404
U.S. 1027 (1972). In Spencer the suit leveled an attack at all NewJersey districts and sought
a general redrawing of school district lines. The suit alleged that if the presently existing
lines were maintained it would be mathematically impossible in many districts to achieve
racial balance. Id. at 1237. The district court concluded that reasonable school district lines
which happen to separate black from white students cannot be invalidated in the absence
of a showing of de jure segregation and, further, that Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c, creates no obligation to use racial pupil assignments to correct de
facto segregation. Id. at 1242-43. Thus the court used the distinction between de factoand
de jure segregation to support its conclusion that racially imbalanced district existing side
by side does not per se constitute an equal protection violation.
Milliken represents a hybrid between the "splinter" cases and Spencer. While in
Milliken there had been a violation of equal protection within the Detroit school system, it
was not directly related to the creation or alteration of school district lines. Thus, the issue
in Milliken is related to the extent of the "condition that offends" and the appropriate
scope of the remedial duty, while Spencer is limited to the conditions under which the
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under the Keyes rationale. 77 It refused, however, to employ shifting
presumptions to the alleged de jure segregation extending beyond
Detroit's city limits.7 8 Although there was some evidence of interdistrict
discrimination by the state, Chief Justice Burger treated it as de
minimis79 and limited the state's derivative responsibility for acts of its
school districts to the confines of the district.8 0 The Chief Justice
concluded that "[t]he constitutional right of the Negro respondents
residing in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in that district."8'
Clearly the Burger opinion in Milliken refused to expand the
geographical consequences of an initial de jure violation beyond the
corporate limits of Detroit. It is not clear, however, why the Court
rejected precedent which could have been used to support such an
expansion in the Detroit case. Nor is it clear to what extent such
precedent may have continuing influence in metropolitan litigation
after Milliken. The Milliken plurality enlisted support for the "Detroit
only" result by considering the potentially adverse effects of a
multidistrict order on the autonomy of local districts, and the"deeply
rooted" tradition of local control over public schools.8 2 It further noted
mantenance of district lines between segregated districts, without more, justifies an initial
finding of a violation.
77. 118 U.S. at 738 & n.18.
78. Id. at 741-12 g n.19. The Court distinguished Keyes by stating "the use of significant
racial imbalance in schools within an autonomous school district as a signal which
operates simply to shift the burden of proof, is a very different matter from equating racial
imbalance with a constitutional violation calling for a remedy." Id. at 741 n.19.The lower
court could have simply ordered the neighboring districts joined as defendants prior to its
remedial consideration and focused on the scope of the violation rather than on the
propriety of an interdistrict remedy. Compare Beer, The Nature of the Violation and The
Scope of the Remedy: An Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley in Terms of the Evolution of the
Theory of the Violation, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 903 (1975), with West, Another View of the
Bradley Violation: Vould a Different Evolution Have Changed the Outcome?, 21 WAYNE
L. REv. 917 (1975).
79. 418 U.S. at 750-51.
80. Id. at 745.
81. Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
82. As to the autonomy of local districts, the court conceded that state law, including the
creation and maintenance of political subdivisions, "are not sacrosanct and if they conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate
remedies." Id. at 744. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger stated that for reasons of public
policy a substantial showing must be made before the federal courts may justifiably
interfere with the state's educational processes: "No single tradition in publiceducation is
more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has
long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support
for public schools and to the quality of the educational process." Id. at 741-42.
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the inability of the Court to effectively administer such plans. 3 Such
considerations may be read as mere dicta in the Detroit case insofar as the
decision turned on the failure of the district court to join the suburban
districts8 4 or to take evidence regarding the effect of suburban policies
and practices on existing segregation within the Detroit schools.8 5
Justice Stewart, concurring to form a majority, indicated support for
this restrictive reading of Milliken. "In the present posture of the case
... , the Court does not deal with questions of substantive constitutional
law."8 6 The district court's metropolitan desegregation plan must be
reversed under Justice Stewart's view because "[t]he formulation of an
interdistrict remedy was.., simply not responsive to the factual record
before the District Court. '87 Taken from this perspective, Milliken
represents the imposition of tolerable restraints on the Court's otherwise
expansive treatment8 8 of an initial de jure showing. Further, the decision
represents a first attempt to articulate the limits of equitable remedial
powers in terms of competing policy considerations.8 9
To the extent that the Burger result in Milliken depends upon
defining the geographical scope of an initial de j ure finding by an ad hoc
evaluation of competing policy considerations, the opinion may
indicate that analysis adopted in Swann and Keyes simply has no
application to the resolution of multidistrict issues. Rather, a broad
reading of Milliken suggests that a finding of an intent to discriminate
within a single district acts only to trigger further inquiry. This inquiry
would examine segregated conditions outside the district's jurisdic-
tional boundaries, and would also examine the activities of the state that
may have had substantial interdistrict effects. In light of the facts
presented in each case, the court could evaluate the costs of achieving an
83. The majority maintained that judicial imposition of an interdistrict remedy would
raise a panoply of administrative, political and financial problems "which few, if any,
judges are qualified to perform." Id. at 744.
84. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
85. This reading is suggested upon a comparison of the Burger opinion with that of
Justice Stewart and by the Court's failure to remand the case for further consideration of
whether interdistrict violations had occurred.
86. 418 U.S. at 753 (Stewart, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 756 (emphasis added).
88. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
89. See Dell'Ario, Remedies for School Segregation:A Limit on the Equity Power of the
Federal Courts?, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 113 (1975). Fora sociological analysis of the costs
and benefits of school desegregation see Hawley & Rist, On the Future Implementation of
School Desegregation: Some Considerations, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 412 (1975).
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equal educational opportunity throughout the system. The Court
might then accommodate competing values by defining the scope of the
violation according to the results of a balancing process. 90 While neither
the tradition of local schools nor the desirability of an equal educational
opportunity alone would be determinative of de jure segregation,
consideration of these and other factors peculiar to the case would
precede a finding of its geographical extent.
III. DEVELOPING A LITIGATION STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE MULTIDISTRIcr
RELIEF
The dissenting Justices in Milliken severely criticized the result
reached by the majority:
90. This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's re-evaluation of Milliken in
Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976). Initially, the violation in Gautreaux was based
upon racially discriminatory site selection and tenant assignment policies enforced by the
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). See Rubinowitz & Dennis, School Desegregation Versus Public
Housing Desegregation: The Local School District and the Metropolitan Housing
District, 10 URBAN L. ANN. 145, 145-48 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rubinowitz & Dennis].
See also Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The
Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 187, 197-98 & n.47 [hereinafter
cited as Kushner and Werner]; 8 URBAN L. ANN. 265 (1974). Gautreaux involved a
consolidated action against the CHA and HUD. The district court imposed upon the CHA
a duty to select sites for future public housing in predominantly white areas and ordered
HUD to use its "best efforts" to assist the CHA within Chicago's city limits. 363 F. Supp.
690, 691 (N. D. Il1. 1973). On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Justice Clark remanded for
consideration of a "comprehensive metropolitan area plan that will not only disestablish
the segregated public housing system in the City of Chicago... but will increase the
supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possible." 503 F.2d at 939. Justice Clark emphasized
that Milliken was concerned only with remedies for de jure school desegregation and that
none of the competing values used by the majority in that case to limit equitable powers
were present in the context of racially segregated public housing. Id. at 936. See Kushner&
Werner. supra, at 200-06; Rubinowitz g: Dennis, supra, at 147-48.
The Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Stewart affirmed but criticized Justice
Clark's reading of Milliken: "Since the Milliken decision was based on basic limitations
on the exercise of the equity power of the Federal Court and not on a balancing of
particular considerations presented by school desegregation cases, it is apparent that the
Court of Appeals erred in finding Milliken inapplicable on that ground to this public
housing case." 96S. Ct. at 1544 & n. 11. Justice Stewart's criticism represents a reassertion of
his concurring opinion in Milliken, that the plaintiffs had simply failed to make a prima
facie case of an interdistrict violation. Justice Stewart, however, approached the facts in
Gautreaux by assuming a violation on the part of HUD and the CHA. Gautreaux indicates
the Court's willingness to invoke metropolitan remedies in school desegregation cases
when the multidistrict nature of a particular equal protection violation is clearly shown.
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When we rule against the metropolitan area remedy we take a
step that will likely put the problems of the blacks and our society
back to the period that antedated the "separate but equal" regime
of Plessy v. Ferguson.. . Today's decision ... means that there is
no violation of the Equal Protection Clause though the schools are
segregated by race and though the black schools are not only
"separate" but "inferior." 91
While the Milliken result certainly represents a setback to proponents of
integrated schools, it is not likely to alter single district litigation and it
need not become an impenetrable barrier to multidistrict relief. Even the
broadest reading of the Court's holding does not preclude the use of
interdistrict remedial plans, but rather, simply refuses to ease plaintiff's
burden through the unfettered use of shifting presumptions. The
burden on plaintiffs after Milliken will be to develop litigation
strategies in each particular multidistrict challenge that will expand to
the greatest extent possible the geographical implications of some
initial de jure showing. The remainder of this Note will focus on
alternative theories that may be advanced in subsequent disputes over
the imposition of a multidistrict remedy.92
A. Undercutting the "Neighborhood Schools" Arguments
Whether or not the Supreme Court eventually concludes that the use
of shifting presumptions is inappropriate in multidistrict litigation,
plaintiffs should recognize that Milliken will likely infuse some type of
balancing into the courts' consideration of multidistrict relief.
Consequently, plaintiffs should anticipate judicial concern over
competing equitable and policy considerations in developing the theory
of their particular case. More specifically, plaintiffs should attempt to
distinguish Milliken on its facts by emphasizing the unique cir-
cumstances that have combined to create and foster racial polarization
throughout their metropolitan area.
91. 418 U.S. at 759, 761 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
92. See generally Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken - on
Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 535, 576-84. Additionally, the viability of intradistrict relief should be considered.
A pre-occupation with the Milliken result "should not deter intradistrict desegregation
suits in the largest cities from New York to Los Angeles, nor should focus upon the largest
metropolitan centers deter action [in smaller urban districts where segregated schools may
be entirely without need of metropolitan remedies]." Pettigrew, supra note 70, at 818-20 &
n.14.
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Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Milliken relied heavily upon the
autonomy of local districts and the tradition of local control over
schools. Alternative strategies should be advanced to undercut the
impact of these considerations on the court's analysis. Presumably
neither of these considerations would apply when each of the districts
sought to be included within the remedial decree is shown to be in
violation. This theory was successfully advanced in Newburg Area
Council, Inc. v. Board of Education.93
The Sixth Circuit in Newburg ruled that the school district of both
Louisville, Kentucky and surrounding Jefferson County had failed to
desegregate their former de jure dual systems.94 Finding that indepen-
dent violations had occurred within each district95 the court distinguish-
ed Milliken with regard to the geographical breadth of the violation.
The court of appeals proceeded to remand with instructions that state
created school district lines should impose no barrier to the elimination
of "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation ... within each school
district in the county. '"96
In addition to its endorsement of an "independent violations" theory,
the Newburg court also stressed the state statutory scheme in Kentucky
to distinguish Milliken on the issue of local autonomy. The Louisville
school district was "located within the City of Louisville, but its
boundaries [were not] coterminous with the political boundaries of that
city."197 The reason for this is that in Kentucky the county is the "basic
educational unit of the state"98 and school district lines "do not
[necessarily] expand with the boundaries of the city in which it is
93. 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated for rehearing, 418 U.S. 918 (1974), aff'd on
rehearing. 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975). For commentary on
the Louisville litigation see Sedler, supra note 92 at 584-601.
94. Prior to Brown Kentucky law required racial segregation throughout the state. See
510 F.2d at 1361.
95. The two suits, Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ. and Haycroft v. Board
of Educ., had been consolidated but the district court ordered separate trials to determine
the status of each district. 489 F.2d at 927. On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed dismissals
in each of the suits, finding that each district had been segregated prior to Brown. Neither
had yet fully converted to a unitary system.
96. 489 F.2d at 932. Following the Sixth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court vacated,
418 U.S. 717 (1974), and remanded, 418 U.S. 918 (1974), for reconsideration in light of
Mzlliken. The circuit court reinstated its former opinion with minor modifications. 510
F.2d 1358, 1361 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
97. 510 F.2d at 1361.
98. Id. at 1360; see KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 160.010 (1973).
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embraced." 99 Besides failing to create politically autonomous school
districts, the Kentucky legislature had also specifically referred to the
boundaries of school districts as "artificially drawn school district
lines."10 0 The validity of the local autonomy argument similarly
becomes less persuasive whenever the districts themselves have become
"integrally and uniquely related to one another."10' This may occur
either because the individual districts in fact serve a single student
community' °2 or because the district lines have been ignored previously
for segregative purposes.
0 3
Finally, plaintiffs should also attempt to distinguish Milliken on the
related issue of local control over the administration of neighborhood
schools. 104 Chief Justice Burger expressed great concern in Milliken that
99. 510 F.2d at 1361.
100. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 160.048(1) (1973). Asa factual matter it is difficult to support
the proposition that Kentucky exercises any greater control over its school districts than
Michigan does. The lower courts in Milliken characterized the state's control over its
school districts as plenary. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra. While a majority
of the Supreme Court rejected this contention, Justice Marshall observed: "The Majority's
emphasis on local governmental control and local autonomy of school districts in
Michigan will come as a surprise to those with any familiarity with that State's system of
education." 418 U.S. at794 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall pointed out that: (1)
both Michigan's legislature and its supreme court considered education to be a state rather
than a local concern; (2) there is in fact no relationship between school districts and local
political units; (3) the state controls the district's financing; (4) "The Statealsoestablishes
standards for teacher certification and teacher tenure; determines part of the required
curriculum; sets the minimum school term; approves bus routes [and] procedures for
student discipline;" and (5) the state has broad powers to consolidate and merge school
districts without local district consent. Id. at 796.
101. Jenkins v. Township of Morris School Dist., 58 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971).
102. See id. at501,279 A.2d at 629. Jenkins involved a small New Jersey town that housed
most of the blacks in the region. The surrounding township was a white suburban area.
The two districts operated separate elementary schools, but the township sent its high
school students to the town's high school. The court held that the State Commissioner of
Education, under state law, had the authority to prevent the township from withdrawing
its students from the high school because of the sharply increased proportion of black
students that would have resulted. Id. at 503-08, 279 A.2d at 630-33. The court found that
the town and the county were actually one community divided by arbitrary lines, and held
that the State Commissioner of Education could further force a merger of the school
districts to avoid racial imbalance. Id.
103. Compare Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1360(6th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975), with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 749-50
(1974).
104. Prior to Milliken the Court was at best reluctant to recognize the neighborhood
school policy in its formulation of a desegregation scheme. See notes 55, 66-70 and
accompanying text supra. For example, the remedial plan adopted in Swann encompassed
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an interdistrict decree would give rise to an array of complex
administrative problems that would require either a complete restruc-
turing of existing state law or complete district court control over a vast
new super school district.0 5 Given these concerns, plaintiffs in future
litigation ought to consider ways to limit the number of districts that
would be covered by a remedial decree.10 6 In addition, plaintiffs should
emphasize factors that would minimize potential administrative
problems such as existing state control over consolidation procedures or
the state's use of "umbrella" districts for the administration of other
metropolitan services.107
B. Using Milliken to Plaintiff's Advantage
In addition to attempting to dilute the policy supports found to be
persuasive in the Detroit litigation, plaintiffs ought to rely upon
Milliken for the proposition that federal courts retain the power to
impose interdistrict relief in appropriate situations. A majority in
Milliken agreed that multidistrict remedies would be justified if: (1)
"[T]here has been a constitutional violation within one district that
produces a significant segregative effect in another district;"' 08 or (2)
"district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race,"' or (3)
state officials "had contributed to the separation of the races ... by
purposeful racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning
laws."" 0 The first course of action, proving significant segregative
effects, may be of little practical value to litigants without further
guidance from the courts as to how the causal relationship between
over 550 square miles which included the City of Charlotte and surrounding Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina. Without regard to local control, the Swann Court ordered a
"frank - and sometimes drastic - gerrymandering of school districts and attendance
zones," as well as "pairing, 'clustering', or 'grouping' of schools," to achieve
desegregation, even though the newly drawn zones might be "on opposite ends of the
city." 418 U.S. at 775 (White, J., dissenting), quotingSwannv. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27 (1971).
105. 418 U.S. at 743-44.
106. See generally Hain, Techniques of Governmental Reorganization to Achieve
School Desegregation, 21 WAYNE L. Rlzv. 779 (1975).
107. Compare United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975) (Indianapolis 11), with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
796 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. 418 U.S. at 745.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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activities of school authorities and resulting segregative effects are to be
proved. This is particularly important if the theory of shifting
presumptions developed in the intradistrict setting is rejected. The
remaining two alternatives - boundary manipulation and dis-
criminatory use of state housing laws - may prove to be more useful
particularly in light of a recent trend in intradistrict litigation towards
diluting the impact of the de jure/de facto distinction.
1. Using an Expanded Notion of Intent in "Boundary Manipulation"
Disputes
Milliken apparently adopts the de jure standard announced in Keyes:
"[T]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so called
de facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate.""' While
Keyes established an intent test, it failed to articulate the proper means of
discerning segregatory intent." 2 The lower courts have responded by
devising their own evidentiary standards. The trend has been towards
allowing plaintiffs to demonstrate intent by producing evidence on the
effects of racially neutral actions or of a failure to act." 3
11. 413 U.S. at 208; see note 32 supra.
112. For the relationship between purpose or intent to"motive" see Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205,1207 n.1 (1970), who
argues that both "purpose" and "motive" have been given a definitional gloss by the
commentators that does not bear logical analysis. Some commentators have attempted to
distinguish "motive" from "purpose." See Developments in the Law - Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1091-1101 (1969) ("purpose" derives from an "objective" inquiry
into what the legislature sought to achieve whereas"motive" derives from the "subjective"
reasons for legislative action). But the distinction has been persuasively criticized. See
Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83 HARV. L. REv.
1887, 1887-88 n.l("Any subjective reason for legislative action may be restated as an end
which the action is intended to accomplish, andvice versa"). See also Kushner and Werner,
supra note 90, at 208-12 (1975) (discussing concept of shared liability).
113. It is difficult either to prove or to disprove "motivation" particularly when a
collective body such as the school board or state legislature is being examined. Keyes v.
School District No. 1,413 U.S. 189,233-34 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Consequently,
the result in any particular case will largely depend upon the extent to which evidentiary
tests devised by the courts allow intent to be inferred from objective circumstances. The
result will also be affected by the burden of proof rules under the court's formulation. An
examination of lower court decisions since Keyes reveals that some jurisdictions have
interpreted the decision to require that plaintiff establish affirmative actions of defendant
which evince "segregative purpose or motivation." Husband v. Pennsylvania, 395 F.
Supp. 1107, 1133 (E.D. Penn. 1975). SeeJohnson v. San Francisco United School Dist., 500
F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d579 (9th Cir.
1973); Morales v. Shannon, 366 F. Supp. 813 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
Some courts have expanded the examination of intent to any acts or omissions whose
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The extent to which such expanded notions of intent can be useful to
plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation over alleged boundary manipula-
tion was left unanswered by the Milliken majority. While Chief Justice
Burger's statements seem to require some showing of deliberate
discriminatory action by the state," 4 Justice Stewart indicated that
something less may be acceptable. A metropolitan remedy is ap-
propriate, according to Justice Stewart's formulation, when "state
officials [have] contributed to the separation of the races by drawing or
redrawing school district lines."" 5 This statement arguably supports
the imposition of an interdistrict remedy based "only [on] a showing of
racial effect, not purpose."" 6 This difference in approach may dictate
different results in a situation when facially neutral state acts or
omissions foster existing de facto segregation in the metropolitan
setting. The Indianapolis litigation illustrates this potential for
different results.
In 1968 the United States brought suit to desegregate the Indianapolis
schools (Indianapolis J).117 The district court determined that the state
natural, probable, foreseeable and actual consequences are to bring about or to maintain
segregation. See Webb v. School Dist. of Omaha, No. 74-1964 & 74-1993 (8th Cir. June 12,
1975, as amended, July 7, 1975) (court found that segregated results had not only been
foreseeable but that defendants had conscious knowledge of the likelihood of such results);
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (school authorities
acted and failed to act knowing that segregation would be the result of their decisions);
Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1974) ("Benevolence of
motive does not excuse segregative acts."). But cf. Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779
(6th Cir. 1974) (inference of intent is permissible, not mandatory, sustaining the district
court's ruling for defendants). Under this view, the courts having found such evidence of
intent, shift to defendants the burden of affirmatively establishing that their acts or
omissions were not racially motivated. This use of shifting presumptions finds some
support in Keyes. See notes 63-66 supra. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). See generally Marshall, The Standard of Intent: Two Recent Michigan
Cases, 4 J.L. & EDUc. 277 (1975).
Finally, other courts have taken the position that "it is not necessary to prove
discriminatory motive, purpose or intent as a prerequisite to establishing an equal
protection violation when discriminatory effect has been demonstrated. [The question] is
whether defendant's official acts resulted in constitutionally impermissible dual school
system." Berry v. School Dist., 505 F.2d 238,243 (6th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added); see Pride
v. Community School Bd., 488 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1973).
114. See text at note 109 supra.
115. 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
116. Taylor, supra note 35, at 759.
117. 332 F. Supp. 655 (D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920
(1973).
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had failed to eradicate the vestiges of pre-Brown dual schools and began
consideration of an appropriate remedy (Indianapolis II).118 After this
suit against the city had commenced, the civil governments of
Indianapolis and those of the surrounding county were consolidated by
the Indiana legislature into a unified, metropolitan government (Uni-
Gov.)."19 The school system, however, was not included, but was
restricted to the old central city - a situation unique among Indiana
cities.1 20 As a result the school district of Indianapolis was surrounded by
ten independent districts within the otherwise unified city. To further
compound the situation, the aggregate student population of the county
schools are 97.4 percent white, in contrast to the central city's 41.1
percent nonwhite population. 2 1
The district court in Indianapolis II, like the lower court in Milliken,
found that an "Indianapolis only" plan could not eradiate the effects of
former de jure acts. 22 The court conceded "that there was no evidence
that any of the added defendant school corporations have committed acts
of de j ure segregation directed against Negro students living within their
respective borders.' 2 Nevertheless, it ordered the formulation of a plan
covering the ten districts within Uni-Gov and nine surrounding
districts. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the ruling as to the
inclusion of the districts outside of Uni-Gov's boundaries. 24 The lower
court's decision regarding relief within Uni-Gov, however, was
118. 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975). The equal protection
violation was based on a finding that within Indianapolis there had been gerrymandering
of attendance zones, faculty segregation and a pattern of decisionmaking that evidenced "a
purposeful pattern of racial discrimination" including site selections, decisions and a
drawing of attendance zones for neighborhood schools "with the knowledge of
[underlying] residential patterns and housing discrimination." 332 F. Supp. at 666
(Indianapolis 1). Regarding the segregated residential patterns, the Seventh Circuit held
that "school policy has a substantial impact on residential patterns as well as vice versa.
Thus, the appellants are not victims of the inevitable since their predecessors' actions have
contributed in substantial part to the present pattern." 474 F.2d at 89.
119. 332 F. Supp. at 676.
120. Id.
121. 503 F.2d at 76-77.
122. 368 F. Supp. at 1197-99. The court concluded that an Indianapolis-only plan, "if
put into effect, would have the effect of an immediate acceleration of white students into
suburban white enclaves or private schools, so that [the Indianapolis Public School
System] as a whole would predictably have a black majority within a matter of two or three
years." Id. at 1198.
123. Id. at 1203.
124. 503 F.2d at 80, 86.
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remanded to "determine whether the establishment of the Uni-Gov
boundaries without a like reestablishment of [the Indianapolis Public
School System] boundaries warrants an interdistrict remedy within Uni-
Gov in accordance with Milliken."'' 25 The court of appeals then
sidestepped the crucial issue of whether Milliken requires a showing of
deliberate action or merely that state officials contributed to racial
segregation by citing to both the Burger and the Stewart formulations. 26
Under the Stewart test courts would presumably be justified in ordering
interdistrict relief if they find that the civic consolidation without school
consolidation "contributes to the separation of the races." Nevertheless,
a strict application of the Burger approach1 27 would produce the
contrary result.
Plaintiffs in other post-Milliken cases have successfully relied upon
the more liberal Stewart formulation of "intent" to obtain interdistrict
remedies. For example, in United States v. Missouri,t28 plaintiffs urged
the segregative effects of a failure to act under the circumstances of the
case. Prior to 1937 the Kinloch and Berkeley districts had been operated
as a single racially segregated system under Missouri law. Because of a
history of attempts prior to 1937 to split the district on racial grounds,
the eventual incorporation of the city of Berkeley in 1937 was ultimately
found to have been motivated solely by racial considerations.129
Supporting this conclusion was evidence that minority students had
been transferred from the Berkeley district after the incorporation to
insure racially segregated districts. 130 The county school board was
125. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 86 n.23. On the most recent remand, the district court expanded its factual
findings and, citing the Stewart opinion in Milliken, ordered system wide relief within the
boundaries of Uni-Gov. UnitedStates v. Board of School Comm'rs, Civil No. 68-225 (S.D.
Ind., Aug. 1, 1975).
127. Strictly applied, the Burger test requires deliberate boundary manipulation. See
text at note 109 supra. Yet if the Court were to apply a balancing test to the facts of the
Indianapolis case, see text at note 90 supra, the result would probably be in favor of
interdistrict relief because of the nature of the "district" involved.
128. 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo.), afJ'd, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975).
129. In 1937 two unsuccessful attempts were made to divide Kinloch No. 18 into separate
black and white school districts. Shortly after the second unsuccessful attempt at division,
a petition was filed to incorporate the city of Berkeley, the boundaries of which were
almost identical to the boundary lines of the previously rejected white school district. 363
F. Supp. 739, 743.
130. id. Although the new Berkeley and Kinloch school districts each included a
minority of black and white resident students as compared with their otherwise virtually
all-white and all-black student populations, interdistrict transfers were encouraged and
thus the districts remained completely segregated. Id.
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found to have maintained the district line dividing these two systems
with the knowledge of their segregated condition and of the inferiority
of the Kinloch system. This evidence was sufficient even under the
Burger formulation to charge state and county officials with an
affirmative duty to consolidate the districts. The duty attached directly
to the interdistrict nature of the initial violation which had entrenched
segregation into the existing school district structure. The presence of
these "vestiges" shifted to the defendants the burden of justifying their
continuation "of the present ineffective method of school district
organization." 131
The court also included Ferguson-Florissant (a third suburban
district) in its consolidation order. Ferguson-Florissant had not been
directly involved in the creation of the Kinloch District as an all black
district. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit upheld its inclusion in the
remedial decree. The court of appeals held that the segregative effects of
opposition by the Ferguson-Florissant electorate to proposed
reorganization plans and the effects of its failure to take affirmative
actions designed to overcome Kinloch's de jure condition'3 2 constituted
adequate grounds for an interdistrict decree under the circumstances. 13
The district court in Evans v. Buchanan 34 utilized a similar approach
- ordering submission of plans for consolidating the Wilmington
school district with a neighboring county district.135 Plaintiffs
131. 363 F. Supp. at 749. Given the interdistrict nature of the violation regarding the
Kinloch and Berkeley districts, this shifting of the burden with regard to their combined
areas would arguably be justified under Justice Brennan's analysis in Keyes. See text at
notes 63-66 supra.
132. 515 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1975).
[T]he [district] court found that Kinloch was excluded from numerous
reorganization plans proposed by the county and state defendants; on the occasion
in 1949 when Kinloch was included, the plan was defeated by the electorate; and
even though virtually all the school districts in the North area near Kinloch have
been enlarged through annexation since 1948, Kinloch has remained as a small
segregated district.
Id. at 1370 (footnotes omitted).
133. The court distinguished the plan rejected in Miliken by noting that here the
remedy would effect only three districts and that the administration of the plan "will not
result in extensive disruption of public education in Missouri such as may have resulted in
the broad metropolitian plan considered in Milliken. " Id. The plan approved in Missouri
called for a restructuring of the existing school board's membership and authorized the
district court to impost a uniform tax levy throughout the consolidated district up to the
highest rate previously imposed by any of the former districts. Id.
134. 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
135. See notes 159-63 and accompanying text infra.
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challenged a general reorganization statute which excluded the
Wilmington school district from consolidation eligibility. The
Wilmington district, whose student population is over eighty percent
black, was held to have engaged in de jure acts.136 The district court
based its consolidation order, in part, upon the significant interdistrict
segregative effects of the General Assembly's denying the state board of
education authority to redistrict Wilmington. 37
The net result of the decisions in Missouri, and Evans appears to be
that the federal courts are willing to take a liberal view of the segregatory
intent requirement in the multidistrict context, allowing a showing of
segregatory effect to suffice. This view of the intent requirement ought
to be advanced by litigants in those states in which segregation was
formerly required by law or where the effects of a recently completed
district reorganization plan results in racially polarized schools. This
approach has not thus far been challenged by the Supreme Court which
affirmed the Evans decision without an opinion and denied certiorari in
Aissouri. 38
2. Asserting Racially Discriminatory Use of State Housing or Zoning
Laws
The de jure/de facto distinction is grounded in a finding of a causal
relationship between state actions (or inactions) and resulting racial
segregation. Despite the expansion of the de jure classification based on
deriving intent from segregative effects, there is still no duty to integrate
when school authorities have acted without any purpose or intent to
discriminate. t3 9
A number of suits, however, have successfully demonstrated
136. 379 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Del. 1974).
137. 393 F. Supp. at 445, stating-
But for this racial classification, the Board may have consolidated Wilmington with
other New Castle County districts, with the result that the racial proportions of the
districts would have been altered significantly. Even though the State Board may
not have been required to alter the Wilmington District, this Court cannot find that
the exclusion from the Board's powers was racially insignificant. On the contrary,
the reorganization provisions of the Educational Advancement Act played a
significant part in maintaining the racial identifiability of Wilmington and the
suburban New Castle County school districts.
138. See note 1 supra.
139. 418 U.S. at 756 n.2.
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governmental responsibility for residential segregation itself1 ° due to
such practices as: racially motivated site selection and tenant
assignment policies in public housing, discriminatory practices of the
Federal Housing Administration or Veterans Administration insurance
programs, or, zoning and annexation policies that foster racial
segregation. 4 1 The results of most future metropolitan school
desegregation cases may well depend upon the ability of plaintiffs to
prove state responsibility for such discriminatory practices through
empirical sociological data.142 In addition, they will need to prove that
such practices have had a significant impact on present metropolitan
segregation, and convince the courts that such metropolitan residential
discrimination, coupled with de jure discrimination within a single
district, justifies multidistrict school desegregation. Plaintiffs in both
Milliken and Bradley v. Richmond 43 were unable to prove that the
effects of areawide residential discrimination justified a multidistrict
remedy for a single district de jure school violation. 4
140. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state action found in judicial
enforcement of restrictive covenants); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(invalidating zoning ordinance which in effect segregated entire city by race); United
Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th
Cir. 1974). But cf. Lindsey v. Normat, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (dicta that adequate housing is not
a constitutional right); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (holding constitutional a
referendum requirement for approval of low-income housing). See also English v. Town
of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319,323,324 (2d Cir. 1971); SouthernAlameda Spanish Speaking
Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295-296 (9th Cir. 1970).
141. See generally Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives on Housing and School
Segregation, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 833, 840 (1975).
142. See id. at 846-850. Nevertheless, courts have recognized some interrelationship
between residential and public school segregation. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971), the court said.
The construction of new schools and the closing of old ones are two of the most
important functions of local school authorities and also two of the most
complex.... People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in
response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the
patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important
impact on composition of inner-city neighborhoods.
[School site selection policies] may well promote segregated residential patterns
which, when combined with "neighborhood zoning," further lock the school
system into the mold of separation of the races. Upon a proper showing a district
court may consider this in fashioning a remedy.
See generally Goodman, supra note 32, at 320-35.
143. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir.), aff~d by an equally divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (1972).
144. For a comprehensive summary of the major arguments that plaintiffs in the two
cases sought to establish see Taylor, supra note 35, at 763-769. Professor Taylor discusses
the following propositions: (1) federal and state policies helped to foster and maintain
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The district court in Richmond made an extensive analysis of state
action among the three local governmental units and found that viewed
collectively, the discriminatory actions of these authorities had the effect
of locking blacks into the city of Richmond. 45 Examples included
selective school construction policies, racially motivated pupil transfer
plans, and school attendance lines superimposed on segregated housing
patterns. 4 6 Discussing the effects of residential segregation, the court
stated. "The interdependency of housing and school segregation is fully
established by the records. Schools were planned with an eye to separate
racial occupancy and 'opened as such, with zone and division lines
imposed upon segregated housing patterns."' 47 Also contributing to
residential segregation were the state's prior endorsements of restrictive
covenants and prior discrimination in FHA loans.148 The Fourth
Circuit, reversing the district court, acknowledged the existence of
minimal state action perpetuating housing segregation. It found,
however, no "joint interaction" between any two of the school districts,
or any Virginia state officials, for the purpose of promoting segrega-
tion.149 The court concluded that: "The root causes of the concentration
of blacks in the inner cities of America are simply not known and the
district court could not realistically place on the counties the
responsibility for the effect that inner city decay has had on the public
schools of Richmond." 5 0 Since the Supreme Court was equally divided
in Richmond, and thus rendered no opinion, the viability of the
racially segregated neighborhoods; (2) government programs designed to foster fair
housing have failed to overcome the effects of past discrimination; and (3) residential
segregation has principally been caused by public and private discrimination, not by other
factors. See generally Goodman, supra note 32.
145. Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67, 102 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058,
rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
146. Id. at 72-74. Judge Merhige also determined that "[e]mployment, education, and
housing discrimination foster each other in the United States; the effects of one are
causative of the others; they are interdependent phenomena." Id. at 195.
147. Id. at 89.
148. Discrimination was found to have played a part in the selection of urban renewal
sites, the racial occupancy of public housing projects, and in the refusal by FHA to insure
home loans in areas not racially homogenous. Id. at 72-73, 215-20.
149. 462 F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th Cir. 1972).
150. Id. The courts have, however, relied on various theories to impose an affirmative
duty on suburban communities to help relieve the adverse effects of intercity housing
discrimination. See generally Kushner & Werner, supra note90. See also City of Hartford v.
Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
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plaintiff's approach for future litigants is unclear.15'
Plaintiffs in Milliken likewise convinced the district court that state
and federal governmental authorities had contributed to the segregated
housing patterns of the Detroit metropolitan area. The district court
concluded, "The affirmative obligation of the defendant board has been
and is to adopt and implement pupil assignment practices and policies
that compensate for and avoid incorporation into the school system the
effects of residential segregation.' 152 The thrust of the plaintiffs'
argument, however, was quashed by the appellate process. The court of
appeals, "[i]n affirming the District Judge's findings [did not rely] at all
upon testimony pertaining to segregated housing. .."153 causing Chief
Justice Burger to conclude that the case "in its present posture.. . does
not present any question concerning possible state housing
violations."'5 4 Apparently, Justice Stewart did examine the housing
record and found it inadequate. He stated: "No record has been made in
this case showing that the racial composition of the Detroit school
population or that residential patterns within Detroit and the
surrounding areas were in any significant measure caused by
governmental activity."' 55 Nevertheless, it is Justice Stewart's approach
to residential segregation that leaves the door open for future school
desegregation plaintiffs. While joining the majority in its result, Justice
Stewart added that a rmultidistrict remedy may be justified when state
officials have "contributed to the separation of the races . .. by
151. The denial of a metropolitan remedy in Richmond, given the factual
circumstances, represents a more narrow approach to interdistrict relief than that taken by
the Milliken court. First, the fact that Richmond, unlike Detroit, was operated as a pre-
Brown state segregated dual system, seems to cut against the possibility of reliance on
"vestiges" argument regarding based on the original drawing of district lines. Further,
Richmond had formerly been under court ordered segregation so that apparently an
argument based on an affirmative duty attaching at the remedial stage based on the
segregatory effects of a city-suburban split would, by itself, be unsuccessful. Finally, in
Richmond the court was attempting to deal with only three school districts, as compared
to fifty-three in Milliken. Yet the court refused to extend an affirmative duty beyond the
city's boundaries, thus suggesting that the scope of the remedial powers may be defined in
fact by the "depth" of the violation rather than the type of administrative analysis
undertaken by Justice Stewart. In any event, the precedential value of Richmond will
hereinafter be obscured by Milliken.
152. 338 F. Supp. at 593.
153. 484 F.2d at 242.
154. 418 U.S. at 728 n.7. Concerning the propriety of the Chief Justice's conclusions see
Taylor, supra note 35, at 764 n.48. (concluding that the failure to review evidence of
segregated housing was "clearly at odds with long-standing Supreme Court practice").
155. 418 U.S. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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purposeful racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning
laws."' 56 Although the Supreme Court has never squarely faced this
issue, 57 Justice Stewart's position has been adopted by several lower
courts. 158
Evans v. Buchanan 59 may represent a new wave of litigation
attempting to force a re-examination of this issue in the metropolitan
156. Id. at 755.
157. This precise issue was reserved in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,211-
212 (1973); Kelley v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100, 106 n.7 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919
(1973); and Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349,351 n.1 (9th Cir.
1974). See also Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682,689 (5th
Cir. 1969).
158. Mapp v. Board of Educ., 477 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022
(1973), was a pre-Milliken case holding that the school board carries the burden of
establishing that any racial imbalance in the school population "was not the result of any
present or past discrimination on the part of the board or on the part of any other state
agency." Accord, Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579, 586 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974). See also Franklin v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ.,
288 F. Supp. 509, 519 (N.D. Miss. 1968) (school construction case holding that all agencies
of the state, not just local authorities, are to be charged with an affirmative duty to
disestablish state-imposed segregation); Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance
Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833,854 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571(1968) ("the
criterion is whether the state is so significantly involved in the private discrimination as to
render the state action and the private action violative of the equal protection clause").
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, Ybarra v. City of San Jose, 503 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1974),
may have gone even further regarding the possibility of using non-school board activities
as a basis for school desegregation remedies. Plaintiffs alleged that city officials had
discriminated in the granting of variances, zoning and building permits to developers of
land. This discrimination was alleged to have resulted in racially imbalanced
neighborhoods which led to segregated schools. Thus the complaint specifically raised the
issue whether discriminatory land use controls could form the basis for relief from school
segregation. The court of appeals, citing Justice Stewart's concurrance in Milliken,
reversed a motion to dismiss and remanded for a hearing on the merits. The remand was
based on the theory that, even though the alleged discrimination was "one step removed
from the cause," it was sufficient to state an actionable claim under the equal protection
clause. Id. at 1043. Cf. Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975), where a
Brooklyn school board was charged with maintaining a local junior high school in an
unconstitutionally racial manner. The school board arguing "inter alia, that if
segregation exists, it is due to housing patterns fostered and maintained by [New York]
City, state, and federal authorities," all of whom were amongst the host of defendants
impleaded by the school board. Id. at 40. The district court's refusal to dismiss the third
party defendants was reversed by the Second Circuit, stating.
By filing this far-reaching third party complaint the local school board did far more
than seek to set up segregative acts of other agencies as a defense for itself.... It
succeeded initially in getting the District Judge to convert a narrow issue involving
a single junior high school.., into what could only become an issue so broad as to
defy judicial competence ....
Id. at 41.
159. 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975); aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975); see notes 133-36 and
accompanying text supra.
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setting. 60 In ordering defendants to draw up interdistrict desegregation
plans, the Evans court found that state and federal governmental
authorities, largely through their activities in the public and private
housing markets, "elected to place their 'power, property, and prestige'
behind the white exodus from Wilmington and the widespread housing
discrimination patterns in New Castle County.' 6' Concluding "that
governmental authorities are responsible to a significant degree for the
increasing disparity in residential and school populations between
Wilmington and its suburbs"' 62 the Court held, inter alia that such
conduct constituted "segregative action with interdistrict effects under
Milliken."l63
CONCLUSION
Milliken clearly restricted the availability of system wide relief for
racially segregated school districts within a metropolitan area. Prior to
Milliken, the courts had employed shifting presumptions to expand the
geographical implications of an initial de jure violation and thereby
dilute the import of the de jure/de facto distinction. Such expansions
have no doubt contributed to the large scale desegregation of rural and
urban districts throughout the nation. The only major condition of
segregated schools that now relies upon a strict de facto/de jure
distinction to evade the imposition of broad remedial desegregation
decrees is that which exists among and between the independent districts
of racially polarized metropolitan areas.
Plaintiffs in multidistrict desegregation suits should use the Milliken
decision and particularly Justice Stewart's concurring opinion to
develop litigation strategies that are designed to circumvent the
Milliken result. The Detroit case itself relies heavily upon policy
considerations that may be undermined in certain cases by an
appropriate characterization of the initial de jure violation. Additional-
ly, plaintiffs ought to rely upon Milliken's explicit recognition of the
district court's power to invoke multidistrict relief, particularly when
there is evidence of boundary manipulation that results in racial
polarization or when the state's housing or zoning policies have fostered
underlying segregation.
160. See Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684(6th Cir. 1974); Board of School Comm'rs v.
United States, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929(1975); cf. Wheelerv.
Daram, 379 F. Supp. 1352 (D.N.C. 1974).
161. 393 F. Supp. at 438.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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